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MCCUTCHEON v. FEC: SACRIFICING CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
REGULATION IN THE NAME OF FREE SPEECH 
HALEY S. PETERSON∗ 
The 2008 elections marked the first time that campaign spending by 
presidential candidates exceeded $1 billion, more than double the amount 
spent in 2004.1  Private contributions, in particular to the Obama campaign, 
were credited as one of the major reasons for this enormous spending in-
crease.2  Four years later, during the 2012 election, candidates spent $3.2 
billion, doubling spending again according to Federal Election Commission 
(“FEC”) estimates.3  Individuals alone contributed over $540 million to the 
Obama campaign and over $300 million to the Romney campaign.4 
The Federal Elections Campaign Act (“FECA”) sought to limit these 
types of campaign contributions by individuals, among other campaign fi-
nance regulations.  In McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission,5 the 
Supreme Court considered whether aggregate limits on campaign contribu-
tions violated individuals’ First Amendment rights of free speech.6  The 
Court determined that by setting a ceiling on campaign contributions, the 
aggregate limits essentially forced individuals to ration their political partic-
ipation in violation of the First Amendment.7  The Court reasoned that the 
government only could justify limits on free speech in the interest of pre-
venting quid pro quo corruption—that is, money given to public officials in 
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BLOOMBERG (Dec. 26, 2008), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=aerix76GvmRM&pid=newsarchive; see also Jeanne 
Cummings, 2008 Campaign Costliest in U.S. History, POLITICO (Nov. 5, 2008), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1108/15283.html.  
 2.  Cummings, supra note 1.  
 3.  Tarini Parti, $7 Billion Spent on 2012 Campaign, FEC Says, POLITICO (Jan. 13, 2013), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/7-billion-spent-on-2012-campaign-fec-says-87051.html. 
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direct exchange for political favors.8  The Court struck down the aggregate 
limits, concluding that they were not sufficiently related to the govern-
ment’s interest in preventing this type of corruption.9 
The Court should have upheld these limits.  First, the Court incorrectly 
analyzed the government’s interest, breaking with precedent by narrowing 
the definition of corruption.10  Second, there is a significant risk that indi-
viduals will work around other FECA regulations without the aggregate 
limits in place.11  Finally, the Court’s decision leaves open the question of 
FECA’s effectiveness without aggregate limits, threatening to dismantle 
campaign finance regulation altogether. 
I.  THE CASE 
In September 2012, plaintiffs Shaun McCutcheon and the Republican 
National Committee (“RNC”) challenged FECA in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia.12  Specifically, the parties chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the statute’s aggregate limits on campaign 
contributions under the First Amendment.13  FECA contains two limitations 
on political campaign contributions: base limits, which restrict how much a 
contributor can give “to specified categories of recipients,” and aggregate 
limits, which set a ceiling on the overall amount an individual can donate 
over a given two-year election period.14  Base limits apply to contributions 
made by a variety of entities, including “individuals, partnerships, commit-
tees, associations, corporations, unions, and other organizations,” whereas 
aggregate limits apply only to individuals.15  Aggregate limits prevent indi-
viduals from contributing “more than an aggregate of $46,200 to candidates 
and their authorized committees or more than $70,800 to anyone else” dur-
ing a two-year period.16 
                                                          
 8.  Id. at 1448–62. 
 9.  Id. at 1456–58.  
 10.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 11.  See infra Part IV.B.  
 12.  McCutcheon v. FEC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 133, 135 (D.D.C. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1434 
(2014). 
 13.  Id. at 137. 
 14.  Id. at 135 (emphasis added) (citing Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-155, § 307, 116 Stat. 81, 102–03 (2002)). 
 15.  Id. at 135, 136.  
 16.  Id. at 136 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3) (2012), declared unconstitutional by FEC v. 
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (current version at 52 U.S.C.A. § 30116(a) (West 2014))).  
The two-year period begins on January 1 of an odd-numbered year and ends December 31 of the 
following even-numbered year.  See id. § 30116(a)(3).  These limits are adjusted every odd-
numbered year for inflation, thus the limit numbers that the Supreme Court evaluated in McCutch-
eon are higher than the values discussed by the district court.  See id. § 30116(c).  
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Mr. McCutcheon, a voter and resident of Alabama, had made various 
contributions during the 2011–2012 election cycle,17 including contribu-
tions to the RNC, the National Republican Senatorial Committee, and the 
Alabama Republican Party.18  However, he wanted to give additional funds 
to the committees, as well as to numerous candidates, but could not because 
of FECA’s aggregate limits.19  The RNC in turn argued that it should be 
able to accept contributions that donors such as Mr. McCutcheon wanted to 
give.20  The plaintiffs filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction to enjoin 
the FEC from enforcing the aggregate limits under the statute.21 
The district court denied the preliminary injunction and granted the 
FEC’s motion to dismiss, finding the aggregate limits constitutional.22  
First, the court distinguished between campaign contributions, the amount 
an individual can give to a candidate, and campaign expenditures, the 
amount an individual or group can personally spend on a political campaign 
(including, for example, on advertisements to promote a certain candidate 
or cause).23  The court explained that contribution limits are evaluated un-
der a lower level of scrutiny than expenditure limits “because they primarily 
implicate the First Amendment rights of association, not expression, and 
contributors remain able to vindicate their associational interests in other 
ways.”24  The court reasoned that aggregate limits function as contribution 
limits, not expenditure limits, because they restrict a donor’s capacity to 
give funds, rather than a campaign or political party’s ability to spend do-
nated money.25   
The court then analyzed the aggregate limits under a lower level of 
scrutiny.26  In constitutional law, a lower level of scrutiny entails applica-
tion of the closely drawn test: the regulation that impacts a constitutional 
right must be “closely drawn to match a sufficiently important [govern-
ment] interest.”27  The district court noted that the government’s interest in 
                                                          
 17.  Under FECA, an election cycle is defined as “the period beginning on the day after the 
date of the most recent election for the specific office or seat that a candidate is seeking and end-
ing on the date of the next election for that office or seat,” and “a primary election and a general 
election [are] considered to be separate elections.”  Id. § 30101(25).  
 18.  McCutcheon, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 136. 
 19.  Id.  
 20.  Id.  
 21.  Id. at 137, 142.  In response, the FEC filed a motion to dismiss.  Id. at 142.  
 22.  Id. at 142. 
 23.  Id. at 137–38. 
 24.  Id. at 138 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976)) (emphasis added). 
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Id. at 137–38.  
 27.  Id. at 137 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 136 (2003), overruled by Citizens 
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Expenditure limits are 
evaluated under the higher threshold of “strict scrutiny.”  Id.  
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preventing corruption is the only legitimate rationale for limiting First 
Amendment rights and should be narrowly construed.28 
The court described corruption as quid pro quo, which it defined as 
“dollars for political favors,” or more simply, bribery.29  The court also not-
ed, however, that the extent of the government’s interest in preventing cor-
ruption was ambiguous.30  For example, the court understood Citizens Unit-
ed v. FEC31 as allowing for an interpretation of corruption as something less 
than “pure bribery.”32  The court ultimately concluded that since the plain-
tiffs had not contested the base limits, these limits were presumably consti-
tutional for the purpose of preventing corruption.33  The court held that ag-
gregate limits could thus be upheld as a means of protecting and preventing 
“circumvention” of the base limits.34  The plaintiffs appealed directly to the 
Supreme Court.35 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of FECA before McCutcheon was 
based on two primary premises: first, that the Court should apply different 
levels of scrutiny to expenditure limits and contribution limits; and second, 
that the Court should define the government’s interest in preventing corrup-
                                                          
 28.  Id. at 138–39. 
 29.  Id. at 139 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm. (NCPAC), 470 
U.S. 480, 497 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding “[i]nfluence over or access to 
elected officials does not amount to corruption” and “contributing a large amount of money does 
not ipso facto implicate the government’s anticorruption interest” (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 
558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010))).  
 30.  Id.   
 31.  558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
 32.  McCutcheon, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 139 (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361).  
 33.  Id. at 139–40.  
 34.  Id.  The district court explained:  
Eliminating the aggregate limits means an individual might, for example, give half-a-
million dollars in a single check to a joint fundraising committee comprising a party’s 
presidential candidate, the party’s national party committee, and most of the party’s 
state party committees.  After the fundraiser, the committees are required to divvy the 
contributions to ensure that no committees receives more than its permitted share . . . 
but because party committees may transfer unlimited amounts of money to other party 
committees of the same party, the half-a-million-dollar contribution might nevertheless 
find its way to a single committee’s coffers. 
Id. at 140 (citations omitted); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976) (finding that ag-
gregate limits are “no more than a corollary” of base limits and protect constitutionally permissi-
ble base limits from being circumvented).   
 35.  McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1444 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (plurality 
opinion).  The Supreme Court “noted probable jurisdiction.”  Id.  A party can appeal directly to 
the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying “an interlocutory or permanent injunction in 
any civil action, suit or proceeding required by an Act of Congress to be heard and determined by 
a district court of three judges.”  28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012).  
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tion broadly.36  The Court’s 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo37 provided 
the foundation for the understanding that expenditure limits and contribu-
tion limits implicate different First Amendment concerns.38  Buckley also 
suggested that the government’s interest in preventing corruption could ex-
tend beyond the deterrence of blatant bribery, and also could include efforts 
to thwart improper influence and the appearance of corruption.39  After 
Congress amended FECA in 2002, the Court continued to apply different 
levels of scrutiny based on limit type.40  The Court also embraced the broad 
definition of corruption, perhaps even expanding the scope of the govern-
ment’s interest from Buckley.41  Citizens United v. FEC marked a shift in 
the Court’s interpretation of campaign finance regulation when the Court 
determined that the government could only justify a limitation on free 
speech in order to prevent quid pro quo corruption.42 
A.  The Court Distinguished Between Contributions and Expenditures 
and Defined Corruption Broadly In Buckley and Subsequent Cases 
Supreme Court interpretation of FECA originated with the Buckley de-
cision in 1976.  Buckley considered numerous constitutional challenges to 
FECA of 1971 and the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.43  The 1971 Act, in 
relevant part, limited individual campaign contributions to $1,000 per can-
didate with a cap of $25,000 on the total amount an individual could give 
during each election.44  FECA also limited spending by “individuals and 
groups ‘relative to a clearly identified candidate’” to $1,000 per year, and 
imposed certain limits on expenditures by federal candidates and political 
party conventions.45 
In Buckley, the Court determined that contribution limits and expendi-
ture limits implicate different First Amendment concerns and thus warrant 
distinct levels of scrutiny.46  The Buckley Court also implied that the gov-
ernment’s interest in regulating campaign finance could be justified not on-
ly by efforts to prevent quid pro quo corruption, but also the appearance of 
corruption and improper influence.47  The Court continued to apply the con-
tribution-expenditure dichotomy and this broad definition of corruption, 
                                                          
 36.  See infra Parts II.A–B.  
 37.  424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 38.  Id. at 20–21.   
 39.  Id. at 27.   
 40. See infra Part II.B. 
 41.  See infra Part II.B.  
 42.  558 U.S. 310, 359–60 (2010); see also infra Part II.C.  
 43.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6–7.  
 44.  Id. at 7.   
 45.  Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (1970 ed., Supp. IV)).  
 46.  Id. at 19–20.   
 47.  Id. at 27.  
  
28 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES [VOL. 74:23 
perhaps even expanding it, when faced with other challenges to FECA and 
its subsequent versions after Buckley.48 
1.  In Buckley, the Court Established the Contribution-Expenditure 
Limit Dichotomy and Hinted at a Broad Definition of 
Corruption 
The Court in Buckley considered numerous First Amendment chal-
lenges to FECA provisions, including both expenditure and contribution 
limits, brought by presidential and senatorial candidates and political party 
groups.49  The Court struck down campaign spending restrictions but up-
held limits on campaign contributions, differentiating between the First 
Amendment impacts on expenditures and contributions.50 
The Buckley Court found that FECA’s expenditure limits, including 
limits of $1,000 by groups and individuals annually, posed a greater threat 
to First Amendment rights because these spending restrictions directly im-
pacted political expression.51  The Court explained that a limit on spending 
would restrict the candidate’s ability to reach the public through news and 
advertisements by default.52  The Court noted that “virtually every means of 
communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of 
money,” emphasizing that the public’s reliance on “television, radio, and 
other mass media for news and information has made these expensive 
modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political 
speech.”53 
Because the expenditure limits imposed major First Amendment bur-
dens, the Court applied the “exacting scrutiny” test.54  Under this test, the 
government can only limit free speech to further a “vital”55 interest and the 
restriction must bear a “substantial relation”56 to this interest. The Court 
supported the government’s ostensible interest in stopping actual and ap-
parent corruption, but nevertheless determined that the government had not 
                                                          
 48.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 49.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6–8. 
 50.  Id. at 23, 143.   
 51.  Id. at 19.   
 52.  Id.   
 53.  Id.  
 54.  Id. at 44.  This test is also referred to as the “strict scrutiny” test.  See, e.g., McCutcheon 
v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1445 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (plurality opinion) 
(“[R]egardless whether we apply strict scrutiny or Buckley’s ‘closely drawn’ test, we must assess 
the fit between the stated governmental objective and the means selected to achieve that objec-
tive.”); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 141 (2003) (finding that contribution limits were subject 
to a lower level of scrutiny than strict scrutiny). 
 55.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 94 (quoting Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 780–781 
(1974) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 56.  Id. at 64 (quoting Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
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demonstrated how expenditure restrictions would serve this interest.57  The 
Court concluded that limits on campaign spending constituted a major bur-
den on free speech because such limits would automatically impact how 
much, how broadly, or how in-depth a candidate, political party, or individ-
ual could communicate through expensive mass media.58 
Conversely, with respect to the contribution limits of $1,000 per can-
didate (with an overall cap of $25,000), the Court determined that these 
limits involved only a minor limitation on a donor’s speech.59  Even if an 
individual was limited in contributing to a candidate financially, the Court 
reasoned that the individual could still engage freely in political discourse.60  
The individual also could contribute in other ways, such as volunteering for 
a candidate’s campaign.61 
Thus, the Court evaluated the First Amendment impacts of contribu-
tion limits under the closely drawn test,62 the lower level of scrutiny, and 
determined these limits were justified on the basis of preventing actual and 
apparent corruption.63  The Court identified the corruption justification in 
part as an interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption, but also hinted that 
the government could have a legitimate interest in stopping other types of 
corruption.64  The Court noted that the appearance of corruption or “im-
proper influence” is similarly problematic to quid pro quo.65 
Finally, the Court countered appellants’ arguments that FECA’s con-
tribution limits were unnecessary because bribery laws were enough to 
combat corruption.66  The Court found that these laws merely addressed 
                                                          
 57.  Id. at 45.  Instead, the Court reasoned that the government’s true interest behind expendi-
ture limits was leveling the playing field among candidates running for office and curbing cam-
paign spending and costs—both unacceptable government rationales for limiting First Amend-
ment rights.  Id. at 48–49, 54, 57.  
 58.  Id. at 19.  The Court also emphasized the “particular importance that candidates have the 
unfettered opportunity to make their views known,” in order for voters to make informed deci-
sions in elections.  Id. at 52–53. 
 59.  Id. at 20–21.  
 60.  Id. at 21.   
 61.  Id. at 22, 28. The Court also characterized contribution limits as less concerning than ex-
penditure limits since they primarily implicate associational freedoms.  Id. at 24–25.  The Court 
noted that contributions allow individuals to align themselves with a particular candidate and also 
empower “like-minded persons to pool their resources in furtherance of common political goals.”  
Id. at 22. 
 62.  Under the closely drawn test, the government must establish a legitimate interest in limit-
ing speech, and restrictions on speech must be “closely drawn” to this interest to “avoid unneces-
sary abridgment of associational freedoms.”  Id. at 25. 
 63.  Id. at 25–29. 
 64.  Id. at 27.   
 65.  Id. (“Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of im-
proper influence ‘is also critical . . . if confidence in the system of representative [g]overnment is 
not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.’” (quoting U.S. Civil Service Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of 
Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973))).  
 66.  Id. at 27–28.  
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“the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence 
governmental action.”67  This reasoning also seemed to indicate that the 
government’s interest in limiting corruption could extend to a more nu-
anced definition of corruption.68 
The Court concluded that FECA’s expenditure limits violated the First 
Amendment because of their direct restraints on political expression.69  By 
contrast, the Court found that contribution limits were constitutional be-
cause they only minimally impinged on free speech and were enacted for 
the legitimate purpose of preventing corruption.70 
2.  After Buckley, the Court Continued to Apply the Expenditure-
Contribution Limit Dichotomy and Arguably Broadened the 
Definition of Corruption 
When faced with subsequent challenges to FECA and state campaign 
spending laws, the Court consistently continued to evaluate contribution 
limits and expenditure limits under different levels of scrutiny, and ap-
plied—and even broadened—Buckley’s definition of corruption.71 
The Court held expenditure and contribution limits to distinct levels of 
scrutiny under the First Amendment in the wake of Buckley.72  In FEC v. 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life,73 the Court reiterated the concept that “re-
strictions on contributions require less compelling justification than re-
strictions on independent spending.”74  Similarly, in Colorado Republican 
Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC (“Colorado I”),75 the Court recog-
nized that typically contribution limits are constitutional, while expenditure 
limits are not.76  Justifications for this dichotomy echoed Buckley’s reason-
ing: “Restraints on expenditures generally curb more expressive and associ-
ational activity than limits on contributions do,” and thus expenditure limits 
                                                          
 67.  Id. at 28.   
 68.  Id.   
 69.  Id. at 58–59. 
 70.  Id. at 58. 
 71.  See, e.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155–56 (2003); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. 
Campaign Comm. (Colorado II), 533 U.S. 431, 437, 440–41, 456 (2001); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. 
Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386–89 (2000); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC (Col-
orado I), 518 U.S. 604, 610 (1996); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 259–60 (1986); 
NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 493–94, 497–98 (1985); Cal. Med. Ass’n. v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 194–95, 
197–99 (1981). 
 72.  See, e.g., NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 493–94. 
 73.  479 U.S. 238 (1986).  
 74.  Id. at 259–60.  
 75.  518 U.S. 604 (1996).  
 76.  Id. at 610.  The “contribution limits” that the Court found to be constitutional were “lim-
its that apply both when an individual or political committee contributes money directly to a can-
didate and also when they indirectly contribute by making expenditures that they coordinate with 
the candidate.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
  
2015] McCutcheon v. FEC 31 
are subject to a higher level of scrutiny.77  Later, the Nixon v. Shrink Mis-
souri Government Political Action Committee (“PAC”)78 Court continued 
to draw this distinction and applied the closely drawn test for limits on con-
tributions.79 
The Court also continued to define the government’s interest in cam-
paign finance limits as an interest in preventing corruption, including, but 
not limited to, quid pro quo.80  Where Buckley had hinted at the possibility 
of corruption beyond quid pro quo, including “improper influence,”81 the 
Court began to explicitly recognize a broad definition of corruption that in-
cluded undue influence.82  For example, though the Court in FEC v. Na-
tional Conservative Political Action Committee83 (“NCPAC”) found that the 
“hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political 
favors,” the Court also defined corruption as situations where officials are 
“influenced” to act in ways that will bring them the most money, often at 
the cost of their official responsibilities.84  The Court began to emphasize 
concerns that public officials could become “too compliant with the wishes 
of large contributors” and the potential for donations to cloud politicians’ 
judgments and hamper responsiveness to constituents.85 
B.  The Court Reinterpreted FECA’s Free Speech Implications After 
Amendments to the Act in 2002 
The Court considered the constitutionality of campaign finance limita-
tions in a new era when FECA was amended in 2002.86  Congress passed 
the amendments to address concerns that individuals had found ways to 
                                                          
 77.  Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 440. 
 78.  528 U.S. 377 (2000). 
 79.  Id. at 386–88.  
 80.  See, e.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155–56 (2003); Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 456; 
Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 388–89; FEC v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 497–98 (1985). 
 81.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976). 
 82.  See supra note 80. 
 83.  470 U.S. 480 (1985). 
 84.  Id. at 497.  
 85.  See, e.g., Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 440–41 (defining corruption not only as quid pro quo 
arrangements “but also as undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of 
such influence” (citations omitted)); Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 389 (finding that corrup-
tion may include not only quid pro quo but also “the broader threat from politicians too compliant 
with the wishes of large contributors”); see also Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 155–56 (noting that cam-
paign contribution limits are justified “carrying as they do a plain threat to political integrity and a 
plain warrant to counter the appearance and reality of corruption and the misuse of corporate ad-
vantages”).  The Colorado II Court also recognized that circumvention could constitute corruption 
if “unlimited coordinated spending by a party” allowed that party to work around constitutionally 
legitimate contribution limits.  Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 456; see also Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 155.  
This is analogous to the circumvention justification that the district court noted in McCutcheon.  
See McCutcheon v. FEC, 893 F. Supp. 2d. 133, 139–40 (D.D.C. 2012).   
 86.  See infra Parts II.B.1–2.  
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work around the original contribution limits upheld in Buckley.87  The Court 
evaluated the First Amendment impact of these statutory changes in 
McConnell v. FEC,88 maintaining the expenditure-contribution dichotomy 
and the broad definition of corruption under the new FECA framework.89 
1. Congress Passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act to Amend 
FECA 
Congress amended FECA in 2002 with the Bipartisan Campaign Re-
form Act (“BCRA”).90  BCRA was primarily aimed at limiting the use of 
soft money—funds contributed to political parties and limited to nonfederal 
purposes, including “influencing state or local elections.”91 
Congress passed the amendments following the publication of a 1998 
Senate Report entitled Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in 
Connection with the 1996 Federal Election Campaigns.92  At the time, in-
dividuals and corporations could use essentially unlimited amounts of soft 
money on state elections, party support, and general initiatives such as “get 
out the vote.”93  The Report revealed that individuals and corporations were 
able to work around FECA contribution limits by “funnel[ing] soft money 
through state parties, congressional campaign committees, and leadership 
[PACs], where its use for federal election activity becomes difficult to 
trace.”94  Individuals also were giving, and candidates and national parties 
were encouraging, hefty donations in exchange for special treatment and 
access to public officials.95  The Report indicated that the amount of soft 
money raised by parties had increased dramatically, from $89 million in 
1992 to $262 million by 1996.96 
The Report concluded that this vast amount of soft money had under-
mined efforts to stop corruption.97  The Report recommended action to 
                                                          
 87.  See infra Part II.B.1.  
 88.  540 U.S. 93 (2003).  
 89.  Id. at 136–37.  
 90.  Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).  BCRA 
is also known as the McCain-Feingold Act.  
 91.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122–23.  For additional background reading on BCRA and soft 
money issues, see Scott E. Thomas, The ‘Soft Money’ and ‘Issue Ad’ Mess: How We Got Here, 
How Congress Responded, and What the FEC Is Doing, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 
(2003), www.fec.gov/members/former_members/thomas/thomasarticle06.pdf (discussing the is-
sues leading to BCRA, the Act itself, and FEC efforts to implement and enforce BRCRA).  
 92.  S. Rep. No.105-167, pts. I–VI (1998).  
 93.  S. Rep. No. 105-167, pt. V, at 7516 (1998).  
 94.  Id. at 7517–18. 
 95.  Id. at 7517, 7519. 
 96.  Id. at 7517. 
 97.  Id. at 7519. 
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close this “loophole” and crack down on soft money spending.98  Congress 
then passed BCRA in 2002.99 
2.  The Court Maintained the Contribution-Expenditure Dichotomy 
and Broad Definition of Corruption in McConnell 
In McConnell v. FEC, the Court considered the constitutionality of the 
BCRA amendments in a multi-part opinion.100  Justices Stevens and 
O’Connor, joined by a majority of the Court, wrote the first part of the 
opinion, which evaluated limitations on the use of soft money.101  The jus-
tices reiterated that the proper test for evaluating contribution limits under 
the First Amendment was the “less rigorous” closely drawn test.102  The 
majority then determined that BCRA’s restrictions on soft money were con-
stitutional methods of preventing circumvention of the contribution lim-
its.103  Justices Stevens and O’Connor emphasized the importance of defer-
ring to Congress and its knowledge on the most effective measures for 
preventing “circumvention of regulations [such as contribution limits] de-
signed to protect the integrity of the political process.”104 
The McConnell Court also applied a broad definition of corruption in 
its analysis of the amendments.105  The justices found it “firmly established 
that Congress’ legitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple cash-
for-votes corruption” and that this interest also includes thwarting improper 
influence on public officials and its appearance.106  The majority noted that 
this more subtle form of corruption, causing public officials to act based on 
the priorities of their largest donors, could be as problematic as quid pro 
quo corruption, especially because of the difficulties in proving when it oc-
curs.107  Justices Stevens and O’Connor explicitly rejected Justice Kenne-
dy’s “crabbed view” that corruption should be limited to quid pro quo, not-
ing that this definition “ignores precedent, common sense, and the realities 
of political fundraising.”108  Finding that the ability of donors to gain access 
to elected officials through soft money donations fit within a properly broad 
                                                          
 98.  Id. at 7519, 7526. 
 99.  See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).   
 100.  McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 114 (2003). 
 101.  Id. at 114, 122.   
 102.  Id. at 137, 141.   
 103.  Id. at 146, 165–66.   
 104.  Id. at 137; see also FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155 (2003) (“[D]eference to legisla-
tive choice is warranted particularly when Congress regulates campaign contributions, carrying as 
they do a plain threat to political integrity and a plain warrant to counter the appearance and reali-
ty of corruption and the misuse of corporate advantages.”). 
 105.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 136, 142–56.  
 106.  Id. at 136, 150 (citing Colorado II, 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001)).  
 107.  Id. at 153.  
 108.  Id. at 152.  
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definition of corruption, the majority upheld BCRA’s soft money contribu-
tion limits.109 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy all 
dissented from the Stevens-O’Connor opinion, arguing that the soft money 
limits were an unacceptable attack on free speech.110  In particular, the dis-
senters believed that the majority’s definition of corruption went too far.111  
Justice Scalia argued that an organization’s increased access via financial 
backing to a public official it supports is simply par for the course in poli-
tics.112  He noted that donor organizations flock to officials that already 
support their causes (seemingly dismissing arguments that the scenario may 
be the other way around).113  Justice Thomas argued that bribery laws are 
sufficient to thwart both quid pro quo and other less obvious forms of cor-
ruption, while Justice Kennedy explicitly rejected the government’s power 
to stop any corruption other than quid pro quo.114  Finally, Justices Thomas 
and Kennedy both argued that the proper standard of review for any type of 
campaign finance regulation is always strict scrutiny, rather than the closely 
drawn test.115 
C.  The Court Narrowed Its Definition of Corruption in Citizens United 
In Citizens United v. FEC, five members of the Court seemed to break 
with precedent in a narrowed definition of corruption.116  The case came be-
fore the Supreme Court when a non-profit corporation challenged BCRA 
provisions limiting spending on advertisement broadcasting within a certain 
timeframe before an election.117 
The Citizens United Court limited the scope of the government’s inter-
est in preventing corruption as a justification for First Amendment re-
strictions.118  The majority understood Buckley as only allowing campaign 
                                                          
 109.  Id. at 152, 224.  
 110.  See id. at 259 (Scalia, J., dissenting), 266–67 (Thomas, J., dissenting), 291–98 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).  
 111.  See id. at 259 (Scalia, J., dissenting), 291–98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part).  
 112.  Id. at 259 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 113.  Id.   
 114.  Id. at 267 (Thomas, J., dissenting), 291–98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part).   
 115.  Id. at 266 (Thomas, J., dissenting), 308–14 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part).   
 116.  558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010).  Justice Kennedy authored the Citizens United majority opin-
ion and was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.  The Justices 
were aligned essentially identically to their positions in McConnell, with the additions of Justices 
Alito and Roberts to the majority in Citizens United, and Justice Sotomayor replacing Justice 
Souter in the minority, though this time the McConnell dissenters had the majority.  
 117.  Id. at 319–21. 
 118.  Id. at 359–60. 
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finance limits in the interest of deterring quid pro quo corruption.119  The 
Court reasoned that just because individuals “may have influence or access 
to elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt.”120  The 
majority warned that including undue influence in the definition of corrup-
tion essentially gives the government unchecked power to restrict First 
Amendment rights.121  In stark contrast to the reasoning of the McConnell 
majority, the Court concluded that “[i]ngratiation and access . . . are not 
corruption.”122 
The Court ultimately upheld the soft money restrictions of McConnell 
and struck down BCRA limits that impacted when and how corporations 
could broadcast advertisements related to federal elections.123  The majority 
famously held that the government cannot restrict political speech on the 
basis of the “speaker’s corporate identity.”124 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In McCutcheon v. FEC, the Supreme Court reversed the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia and held that aggregate contribu-
tion limits were unconstitutional under the First Amendment.125  Led by 
Chief Justice Roberts, the plurality concluded that “aggregate limits do lit-
tle, if anything, to address [corruption], while seriously restricting participa-
tion in the democratic process.”126  The Court came to this conclusion by 
determining that the holding in Buckley did not apply and finding that the 
aggregate limits were not sufficiently tied to the government’s interest—an 
interest the Court narrowly defined as only preventing quid pro quo corrup-
tion.127 
First, the Court determined that the Buckley holding—that aggregate 
limits were a constitutional means for preventing circumvention of base 
limits—did not apply.128  The plurality noted that multiple “statutory safe-
                                                          
 119.  Id. at 359 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing McConnell, 540 
U.S. at 296–98).  
 120.  Id.  
 121.  Id.  The Court noted that the “appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not 
cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy.”  Id. at 360.  The Court reasoned that spending 
by corporations or other actors in order to “persuade voters” actually underscores that “the people 
have the ultimate influence over elected officials” and undermines arguments that political fund-
ing could threaten the democratic system.  Id.  
 122.  Id. at 360.  
 123.  Id. at 361, 365–66.  
 124.  Id. at 347, 365.   
 125.  134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442, 1462 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (plurality opinion). 
 126.  Id. at 1442. 
 127.  Id. at 1445–46, 1449–52. 
 128.  Id. at 1446 (“Although Buckley provides some guidance, we think that its ultimate con-
clusion about the constitutionality of the aggregate limit in place under FECA does not control 
here.”).  
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guards against circumvention” had become part of the statutory scheme 
since the Buckley decision, such as additional base contribution limits and 
stricter earmarking provisions.129  The plurality concluded that Buckley did 
not control, stating, “[w]e are confronted with a different statute and differ-
ent legal arguments, at a different point in the development of campaign fi-
nance regulation.”130 
Next, the Court weighed the First Amendment interests implicated by 
aggregate limits.131  The plurality explained that the First Amendment 
“safeguards an individual’s right to participate in the public debate through 
political expression and political association.”132  The Court reasoned that 
by imposing a definitive ceiling on the amount an individual can contribute 
to candidates and committees, aggregate limits essentially force an individ-
ual to ration her political participation, thereby limiting the expression and 
promotion of her policy concerns.133 
The Court then emphasized that the government can only regulate 
campaign finance for the purpose of addressing quid pro quo corruption or 
the appearance of this type of corruption.134  Quid pro quo corruption oc-
curs when a donor aims to directly influence a candidate by making dona-
tions with specific political strings attached.135  For example, a donor might 
offer money in exchange for the recipient’s sponsorship of a bill. The plu-
rality noted several activities that do not constitute quid pro quo corruption, 
including “the possibility that an individual who spends large sums may 
garner ‘influence over or access to’ elected officials or political parties.”136  
While acknowledging the difficulty in differentiating between quid pro quo 
                                                          
 129.  Id. at 1446–47; see 11 C.F.R. § 110.6(b)(1) (2014) (“[E]armarked means a designation, 
instruction, or encumbrance, whether direct or indirect, express or implied, oral or written, which 
results in all or any part of a contribution or expenditure being made to, or expended on behalf of, 
a clearly identified candidate or a candidate’s authorized committee.”).  
 130.  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1447 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (plurality opinion).  
 131.  Id. at 1447–50. 
 132.  Id. at 1448. 
 133.  Id. at 1448–49.  The Court rejected arguments that an individual’s participation is mini-
mally threatened by aggregate limits because an individual could simply give smaller contribu-
tions to a greater number of candidates, or contribute in ways outside of the financial realm, such 
as volunteering for a campaign.  Id. at 1449.  The Court noted that forcing an individual to give 
less “because he wants to support more candidates or causes is to impose a special burden on 
broader participation in the democratic process.”  Id.  Furthermore, the plurality argued that “per-
sonal volunteering is not a realistic alternative for those who wish to support a wide variety of 
candidates or causes.”  Id.  
 134.  Id. at 1450–51 (“No matter how desirable it may seem, it is not an acceptable govern-
mental objective to ‘level the playing field,’ or to ‘level electoral opportunities,’ or to ‘equaliz[e] 
the financial resources of candidates.’” (quoting Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. 
Bennett, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 2825–26 (2011); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 741–42 (2008); Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 56 (1976))).  
 135.  See, e.g., id. at 1441, 1451–52 (defining quid pro quo as “a direct exchange of an official 
act for money”).  
 136.  Id. at 1451 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010)).  
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corruption and “general influence,” the Court stressed the importance of 
“err[ing] on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing 
it.”137  In other words, the plurality seemed to find instances of questionable 
sway over elected officials a small price to pay for the robust protection of 
First Amendment rights.138 
The Court also reiterated that even if the government limits free speech 
for the (legitimate) aim of preventing quid pro quo corruption, it still has 
the “burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.”139  This burden 
can be satisfied when the government can show that the limits on free 
speech are appropriately designed (either narrowly tailored or closely 
drawn, depending on the level of scrutiny) to prevent quid pro quo corrup-
tion.140  The plurality did not elaborate on the appropriate level of scrutiny 
to apply to aggregate limits because it found that even if the lower level of 
scrutiny applied, the aggregate limits were not “closely drawn” to prevent-
ing quid pro quo corruption.141 
The government contended that by restricting the total amount of 
money that an individual can donate during an election cycle, aggregate 
limits prevent circumvention of base limits, that is, the limit on how much 
an individual can give to each candidate.142  For example, the government 
argued that without aggregate limits, an individual could give the maximum 
amount allowed by base limits to a particular candidate, and then attempt to 
give more by contributing additional funds to PACs apt to support that 
same candidate.143  The plurality disagreed and instead found that the pos-
sibility of this base limit circumvention was “far too speculative” under the 
current statutory framework and dismissed various examples of circumven-
tion as highly unlikely.144  The Court reasoned that given the implausibility 
of the various circumvention scenarios, the potential alternatives to aggre-
gate limits that would not infringe on First Amendment rights, and the 
blanket ban on every contribution over the aggregate limit threshold, the 
aggregate limits violated the First Amendment.145 
                                                          
 137.  Id.  
 138.  Id.  
 139.  Id. at 1452 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816 
(2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 140.  Id. at 1456–57. 
 141.  Id. at 1446 (“Because we find a substantial mismatch between the Government’s stated 
objective and the means selected to achieve it, the aggregate limits fail even under the ‘closely 
drawn’ test.  We therefore need not parse the differences between the two standards[, strict scruti-
ny and closely drawn,] in this case.”). 
 142.  Id. at 1452–53. 
 143.  Id. at 1453.  
 144.  Id. at 1452–56. 
 145.  Id. at 1458–59. 
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Concurring, Justice Thomas agreed with the plurality that aggregate 
limits were a violation of First Amendment rights.146  He argued, however, 
that Buckley should be overruled in its entirety.147  Justice Thomas rejected 
Buckley’s distinction between campaign expenditures and campaign contri-
butions (with campaign contributions subject to a lower level of scrutiny 
under the closely drawn test), and contended that both should be subject to 
the same heightened level of (strict) scrutiny in evaluating possible First 
Amendment infringements.148  Justice Thomas argued that contrary to the 
reasoning in Buckley, campaign contributions directly impact free speech by 
“amplifying the voice of the candidate and help[ing] to ensure the dissemi-
nation of the messages that the contributor wishes to convey.”149  Justice 
Thomas agreed with the plurality that aggregate limits “would surely fail” 
under First Amendment strict scrutiny.150 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, 
dissented.151  The dissent took issue with three primary premises advanced 
by the plurality: 1) that the government only has an interest in preventing 
quid pro quo corruption; 2) that aggregate limits are unnecessary for pre-
venting the circumvention of base limits; and 3) that aggregate limits are 
not closely drawn to the government’s interest in protecting base limits.152 
First, Justice Breyer argued that the plurality’s definition of corruption 
was too narrow, breaking with the foundational purposes for the First 
Amendment and the definition of corruption from precedent.153  The dissent 
highlighted the historical importance of the First Amendment as a tool to 
foster a “chain of communication between the people, and those, to whom 
they have committed the exercise of the powers of government.”154  Noting 
the clear risk that unchecked contributions could threaten the responsive-
ness of elected officials to their constituents, the dissent contended that cor-
                                                          
 146.  Id. at 1464 (Thomas, J., concurring) (agreeing with the plurality that “limiting the amount 
of money a person may give to a candidate does impose a direct restraint on his political commu-
nication”).  
 147.  Id. at 1462. 
 148.  Id. at 1462–64.  Justice Thomas contended, “[c]ontributions and expenditures are simply 
‘two sides of the same First Amendment coin.’”  Id. at 1464 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 241, 244 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).  
 149.  Id. at 1463 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t, 528 U.S. 377, 
415 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 150.  Id.   
 151.  Id. at 1465.  
 152.  Id. at 1465–66. 
 153.  Id. at 1466–70 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 154.  Id. at 1467 (quoting JAMES WILSON & THOMAS MCKEAN, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 30–31 (1792)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
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ruption should be afforded a broader, more nuanced definition than blatant 
bribery.155 
The dissent offered the following definition of corruption: any contri-
butions that may have an “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment,” 
that lead to “privileged access” to these officials, and the appearance of 
these types of corruption.156  Justice Breyer supported this definition with 
an extensive documentation of prior decisions in which the Court had de-
fined corruption to include improper influence over elected officials by 
wealthy donors, even if this influence did not rise to the level of quid pro 
quo deals.157 
Justice Breyer also rejected the plurality’s arguments that aggregate 
limits are unnecessary for protecting base limits.158  Primarily, he argued 
that these limits are essential to prevent circumvention and offered three 
situations where donors are able to work around base limits in the absence 
of aggregate limits.159  In addition, the dissent countered the plurality’s 
claim that changing laws had made aggregate limits unnecessary.160  For 
example, even though Congress had imposed additional restraints on con-
tributions to PACs, the dissent argued that “[f]ederal law places no upper 
limit on the number of PACs supporting a party or a group of party candi-
dates that can be established.”161  Thus political party supporters could 
simply create additional PACs and new recipients for contributions.162 
Finally, Justice Breyer argued that aggregate limits are narrowly tai-
lored to the government’s interest in preventing circumvention of base lim-
its.163  Justice Breyer contended that though the plurality offered alterna-
tives to aggregate limits to achieve this purpose, it did not “show, or try to 
show, that these hypothetical alternatives could effectively replace aggre-
gate contribution limits.”164  Furthermore, the dissent noted that the “hypo-
                                                          
 155.  Id. at 1468–69 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1976)). 
 156.  Id. at 1469–70 (quoting FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155–56 (2003)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 146–52 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. 
Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000)). 
 157.  Id. at 1468–70; see, e.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155–56 (2003) (defining cor-
ruption as “not only . . . quid pro quo agreements, but also as undue influence on an officeholder’s 
judgment”); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003) (“Just as troubling to a functioning de-
mocracy as classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger that officeholders will decide issues not 
on the merits or the desires of their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have 
made large financial contributions valued by the officeholder.”).  
 158.  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1471–79 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 159.  Id. at 1472–75.  See infra Part IV.B.1 for an in-depth discussion of one of these scenarios 
in which donors are able to work around base limits in the absence of aggregate limits.  
 160.  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1475 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 161.  Id.  
 162.  Id.  The dissent contended, “creating a [new] PAC is primarily a matter of paperwork, a 
knowledgeable staff person, and a little time.”  Id.   
 163.  Id. at 1479. 
 164.  Id.  
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thetical presence” of these alternatives when Buckley was decided did not 
impact the Court’s holding in that case that aggregate limits were constitu-
tional.165 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court should have upheld FECA’s aggregate limits in 
McCutcheon.  First, the Court defined the government’s interest in prevent-
ing corruption too narrowly, breaking with precedent in this definition and 
failing to defer to Congress’s understanding of corruption.166  Second, 
without aggregate limits, individuals can and have been able to work 
around other valid FECA regulations, including base limits.167   Ultimately 
the Court’s decision threatens to dismantle campaign finance regulations 
entirely.168  Without aggregate limits, base limits are meaningless and indi-
viduals will be able to contribute as much money as they want, as long as 
the number of local party committees and PACs continues to grow.169 
A.  The McCutcheon Court Incorrectly Narrowed the Definition of 
Corruption. 
In McCutcheon, the plurality struck down aggregate limits based in 
part on its holding that the government’s interest in deterring corruption is 
strictly limited to the prevention of quid pro quo corruption and its appear-
ance.170  This definition of corruption was too narrow and broke with prec-
edent.171  The Court should have deferred to Congress’s definition of cor-
ruption, which would include forms of corruption beyond quid pro quo.172 
1.  The Plurality’s Definition of Corruption Was Too Narrow and 
Inconsistent with Precedent 
The plurality’s exceedingly narrow definition went against prece-
dent.173  In prior cases, the Court consistently defined corruption as extend-
ing beyond quid pro quo and including the interest in preventing improper 
influence.174  Only one case, Citizens United, limited the definition of cor-
ruption to quid pro quo, the definition used by the McCutcheon plurality.175  
                                                          
 165.  Id.  
 166.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 167.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 168.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 169.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 170.  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450–51, 1462 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (plurality opinion). 
 171.  See infra Part IV.A.1.  
 172.  See infra Part IV.A.2.  
 173.  See infra note 177; see also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1468–70 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 174.  See infra note 177; see also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1468–70 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 175.  See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359–60 (2010). 
  
2015] McCutcheon v. FEC 41 
That definition was dictum in Citizens United and limits corruption to ac-
tions that would already be punishable under criminal bribery laws.176 
The Court’s precedent establishes that corruption extends beyond quid 
pro quo.177  For example, the Buckley Court alluded to the fact that the gov-
ernment may have a legitimate interest in preventing “improper influ-
ence.”178  The Court also recognized that bribery laws outside of FECA 
were only equipped to address the “most blatant and specific attempts of 
those with money to influence governmental action,” seemingly emphasiz-
ing FECA’s role in addressing less obvious forms of corruption.179  In the 
wake of Buckley, the Court explained the government’s interest in address-
ing broad forms of corruption even more explicitly, including recognizing 
the government’s valid efforts to thwart “undue influence on an officehold-
er’s judgment” and acts of “politicians . . . too compliant with the wishes of 
large contributors.”180  The McConnell Court emphasized that undue influ-
ence, making officials more beholden to wealthy contributors than their 
constituents, was “[j]ust as troubling” as quid pro quo corruption.181 
Citizens United is the only case that lends support to the plurality’s 
narrow reading of corruption.182  However, the Citizens United majority’s 
                                                          
 176.  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1471 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Zephyr Teachout, The 
Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 391 (2009). 
 177.  See, e.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155–56 (2003) (defining corruption as both 
quid pro quo and undue influence); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003) (“Just as trou-
bling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger that officehold-
ers will decide issues not on the merits or the desires of their constituencies, but according to the 
wishes of those who have made large financial contributions valued by the officeholder.”); Colo-
rado II, 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001) (noting that corruption is “understood not only as quid pro quo 
agreements, but also as undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of 
such influence”); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389–90 (2000) (defining corrup-
tion as including not only quid pro quo, but also “‘improper influence[,]’ . . . ‘opportunities for 
abuse,’  . . . and officials too compliant with the wishes of large contributors” (quoting Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976))); FEC v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 497–98 (1985) (finding that 
though the “hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo,” it is also situations where offi-
cials are “influenced” to act in ways that will bring them the most money, often at the cost of their 
official responsibilities); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (finding that “improper influence” could be of 
equal concern to Congress as quid pro quo corruption); see also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1466–
70 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Teachout, supra note 176, at 391 (“For twenty-two years, the Court 
clearly explained (in majority opinions) that quid pro quo was but one type of corruption.”).  
 178.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.  
 179.  Id.   
 180.  Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 440–41; Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 389.  
 181.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 153.  
 182.  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1470–71 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Citizens United v. 
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010)).  Zephyr Teachout argues that the FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life 
decision marked the turning point where the Court determined that quid pro quo was “the heart of 
corruption.”  Teachout, supra note 176, at 391 (citing FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 
449, 478 (2007)).  However, the Wisconsin Right to Life Court did not explicitly rule out other 
understandings of corruption as the Citizens United majority did.  Compare Wis. Right to Life, 551 
U.S. 449, 478–79 (2007) (finding that an interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption was not a 
legitimate justification for regulating issue advertisements), with Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 at 
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discussion of corruption can be treated as dictum because it was unneces-
sary for the holding that struck down free speech limits on corporations.183  
Citizens United also did not explicitly overrule the broad definition of cor-
ruption that the McConnell Court used to uphold soft money limits.184  Ad-
ditionally, the McCutcheon plurality left the soft money limits from 
McConnell intact, while dismantling the very definition of corruption (ex-
tending beyond quid pro quo) on which McConnell’s soft money holding 
depended.185  This fact reiterates that the McCutcheon plurality mistakenly 
narrowed the scope of the government’s anti-corruption interest. 
Furthermore, the plurality’s quid pro quo definition would limit cor-
ruption to activities that are already actionable under criminal bribery 
laws.186  Professor Zephyr Teachout notes that this definition is attractive in 
its simplicity: essentially the Court need only look to criminal bribery laws 
to determine whether or not there has been corruption.187  However, this 
limited definition not only cuts against precedent, but also undermines the 
importance of preventing other, broader types of corruption, of which the 
Framers’ were acutely aware in their drafting of the Constitution.188  De-
bates about the size of the Senate and the House of Representatives, how 
members of Congress would be elected, the checks and balances system, 
the impeachment of the President, and many other major aspects of the 
Constitution were based on the Framers’ concerns that corruption could 
threaten the “integrity” of the democratic system.189 
2.  Congress, Not the Court, Should Define Corruption 
The McCutcheon plurality broke with precedent in its definition of 
corruption, but perhaps the Court should not have offered a definition at 
                                                          
359 (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing cor-
ruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption.”). 
 183.  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1471 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. 
at 365).  
 184.  Id. (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359, 360–61 (“This case . . . is about independent 
expenditures, not soft money.”)).  
 185.  Id. (“Our holding about the constitutionality of the aggregate limits clearly does not over-
rule McConnell ‘s holding about ‘soft money.’” (quoting id. at 1451 n.6)). 
 186.  See Teachout, supra note 176, at 388–91.  Justice Breyer also seems to hint at this idea in 
the McCutcheon dissent.  See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[The 
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bers of Congress.”  Id.  
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all.190  Arguably, the Court should have deferred to Congress’s definition of 
corruption because Congress “defin[es] the legislator’s role in our democra-
cy.”191  The Court’s own precedent recognizes the need for this defer-
ence.192  If the Court had deferred to Congress, it is clear that Congress it-
self understood the interest in preventing corruption to include types of 
corruption beyond quid pro quo.193 
Professor Deborah Hellman argues that in campaign finance jurispru-
dence, “the Court has . . . missed the significance of the fact that defining 
legislative corruption entangles the Court in defining the legislator’s role in 
our democracy.”194  Professor Hellman’s analysis is particularly relevant in 
the wake of McCutcheon because she argues that the Court should stay out 
of determining the boundaries of corruption all together.  She contends that 
defining corruption necessarily implicates a verdict on what constitutes 
good and bad governance by legislators, a decision for Congress and not the 
Courts.195  Justice Breyer also articulates this concern in his McCutcheon 
dissent.196 
Professor Hellman notes that an understanding of corruption is based 
on a parallel theory for how a democracy, and its public officials, should 
operate.197  For example, if the theory is that voters have trusted the legisla-
tor to employ her best judgment in making decisions, then corruption would 
be anything that undermines this judgment.198  If the understanding is that 
the legislator should answer directly to her constituents, corruption exists 
when “a legislator weighs the preferences of some too heavily,” particularly 
the predilections of rich donors.199  Quid pro quo corruption is implicated in 
the final theory, that a legislator is acting pursuant to his obligations as long 
as she is not making decisions based on an exchange of money or other 
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benefits for her votes.200  Professor Hellman argues that in this final scenar-
io, a public official “need merely avoid bribery or its very close cousins in 
order to avoid corruption.”201 
The Supreme Court should recognize that it is overstepping its authori-
ty when it attempts to define corruption.  In doing so, it “implicitly adopts 
one particular, contested conception of a legislator’s role in a well-
functioning democracy” over others.202  Though the Court has not apparent-
ly recognized the link between defining corruption and defining good gov-
ernance, it has more generally addressed the importance of deferring to 
Congress in evaluating contribution limits.203  In McConnell, the Court not-
ed the importance of evaluating contribution limits under a lower level of 
scrutiny, deferring to Congress’s “ability to weigh competing constitutional 
interests in an area in which it enjoys particular expertise.”204  Similarly, the 
Court in Beaumont found that “deference to legislative choice is warranted 
particularly when Congress regulates campaign contributions, carrying as 
they do a plain threat to political integrity.”205  The McCutcheon dissent al-
so argued that Congress, rather than the judiciary, was “far better suited” to 
define corruption and the solutions for preventing it.206 
The McCutcheon Court, rather than being concerned with overstep-
ping its own authority, believed that Congress had gone too far.207  The plu-
rality warned against deference to Congress, arguing that when Congress 
regulates campaign finance for purposes other than combatting quid pro 
quo corruption, it is essentially determining who should be in political pow-
er.208  The plurality contended that elected representatives should be the 
“last people to help decide who should govern.”209  Legal scholars have 
called this argument the “incumbent self-protection” rationale.210  Under 
this theory, justices have rationalized striking down campaign finance regu-
lations, arguing that they are a guise for incumbents to ensure their own 
reelection.211 
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This concern arguably has merit.212  However, allowing the justices to 
step in to counter incumbent self-protection problems raises line-drawing 
issues, and questions of how the Court would determine “[h]ow much en-
trenchment is too much” and when an official’s efforts to regain office are 
reasonable versus illicit.213  These questions bear significant resemblance to 
political gerrymandering issues, which the Court has determined are non-
justiciable.214  It is true that deferring to Congress’s definition of corruption 
in campaign finance regulation could lead to entrenchment of incumbents.  
It is also apparent that the task of defining corruption in this context can be 
daunting and has plagued the Court and legal scholars alike.215  However, 
this difficult policy-making is the type of challenge that Congress, not the 
Court, was designed to address. 
Had the Court deferred to Congress’s definition, it is clear that the 
congressional definition encompasses corruption beyond quid pro quo, at 
least during the years prior to, and when, Congress passed BCRA.216  In 
pushing for amendments to FECA to stop the flow of soft money in cam-
paign finance, a Senate Report recognized that the “appearance of corrup-
tion, in which large contributions appear to be traded for access to govern-
ment officials or favored treatment, and the resulting loss of public 
confidence in government,” were the most concerning impacts of soft mon-
ey.217  The Report cited numerous examples of large contributions leading 
to privileged access to the Executive Branch, as well as private events and 
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photo opportunities with other prominent officials.218  The Report also en-
dorsed the Buckley Court’s definition of corruption as including “improper 
influence.”219  Evidently the Senate’s concerns extended beyond blatant 
quid pro quo, and the McCutcheon plurality would have come to a broader 
definition of corruption had it deferred to Congress’s understanding at the 
time of the BCRA amendments. 
Ultimately, the McCutcheon plurality erred in finding that the govern-
ment’s interest in preventing corruption only extends to preventing quid pro 
quo corruption.  The plurality broke with precedent in adopting this narrow 
definition.220  The Court arguably should not have defined corruption in the 
first place, and instead should have deferred to Congress’s definition of cor-
ruption, which encompassed more than simply quid pro quo arrange-
ments.221 
B.  The Court’s Decision Will—and Already Has—Led to 
Circumvention of Other FECA Limits 
The McCutcheon Court should not have rejected aggregate limits as a 
means for preventing the circumvention of base limits.  The plurality ar-
gued that the risk of circumvention was “far too speculative” and that new 
campaign finance laws and existing bribery laws had essentially eliminated 
the possibility of base limit circumvention.222  In making this conclusion, 
the plurality failed to give enough weight to the dissent’s examples that ag-
gregate limits do in fact prevent circumvention and also corruption, includ-
ing quid pro quo.223  Second, in the wake of McCutcheon, it is clear that 
donors can and will work around other FECA limits, regardless of other 
FEC regulations in place.224 
1.  The Dissent’s Examples of Circumvention Establish That 
Aggregate Limits Are Necessary for Preventing Corruption 
The dissent offered numerous examples of how individuals could 
thwart other campaign finance regulations in the absence of aggregate lim-
its.225  The dissent noted that without aggregate limits, contributors could 
“find ways to channel millions of dollars to parties and to individual candi-
dates, producing precisely the kind of ‘corruption’ or ‘appearance of cor-
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ruption’ that previously led the Court to hold aggregate limits constitution-
al.”226  In one example, based on warnings by the FEC, the dissent ex-
plained how an individual would be able to contribute approximately six-
teen times the amount of funding to a given party than she could have oth-
otherwise if aggregate limits were in place.227 
In this example, the dissent first explained the base limits228 and ag-
gregate limits.229  The dissent noted that without aggregate limits, an indi-
vidual could legally give either one of the major parties in the U.S. approx-
imately $1.2 million in a two-year election cycle.230  Each political party 
has 50 committees, thus the donor could donate $10,000 each year to 50 po-
litical party committees, amounting to $1 million in a two-year election cy-
cle.231  In addition, the individual could donate $194,400 total to national 
party committees (base limits of $64,800 per election cycle to a national 
party committee, multiplied by three national party committees for each na-
tional party).232  Each party then could create a “Joint Party Committee,”233 
made up of the national and state party committees, which would facilitate 
the process for contributors to make large donations to multiple party com-
mittees.234  Under this system, the individual would be able to write one 
check to the joint committee, which could then divide up the funds as nec-
essary so that the individual would be in compliance with the base limits.235  
By contrast to the total $1.2 million a donor could give under this scenario, 
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with aggregate limits in place, the donor could only have contributed 
$74,600 (the aggregate limit on contributions to political committees).236 
During the 2012 election cycle, a similar scenario occurred in reali-
ty.237  Candidate Mitt Romney’s joint fundraising committee Romney Vic-
tory was able to generate funds for “Republican Party committees in four 
non-competitive states . . . which were then able to make unlimited transfers 
to state GOP committees in 10 swing states.”238  This strategy enabled con-
tributors to work around the base limits on party committee contribu-
tions.239  The contributor would give the maximum amount to the joint 
committee, which would then distribute these funds to four state party 
committees in non-battleground states.240  In turn, the state party commit-
tees, which are allowed to make “unlimited transfers among themselves,” 
could pass these funds on to a single state committee in a swing state.241  
Thus the individual’s complete contribution “would end up boosting the 
Romney campaign in a key battleground.”242  The Huffington Post reports 
that a minimum of 174 contributors gave the joint committee the maximum 
committee contribution, which was then funneled to Republican Party 
committees in battleground states.243  Though this situation occurred even 
in the absence of aggregate limits, aggregate limits are an additional safe-
guard to make this type of circumvention less likely and more difficult to 
achieve. 
The McCutcheon Court was incorrect to conclude that these scenarios 
do not raise corruption concerns.  These situations will almost certainly lead 
party officials to “solicit . . . large contributions from wealthy donors” for 
joint party committees.244 Garnering these contributions allows officials to 
direct funds to the states where they are most needed and also accept larger 
donations, by distributing the donation so that it complies with base lim-
its.245  Then the party official may “feel[] obliged to provide [the wealthy 
donor] special access and influence, and perhaps even a quid pro quo legis-
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lative favor.”246  This is exactly the type of corruption the Court was con-
cerned about when it upheld BCRA’s soft money limits in McConnell.247 
2.  In the Real World, Circumvention Is Already Occurring in the 
Absence of Aggregate Limits 
The McCutcheon plurality also noted the “improbability of circumven-
tion,” especially in light of regulations already in place.248  In support of 
this argument, the plurality in particular relied on an FEC regulation that 
prohibits individuals who have given to a candidate from “also con-
tribut[ing] to a political committee that has supported or anticipates sup-
porting the same candidate in the same election” if the contributor knows 
that some of the funds he gives to the committee will also go to the candi-
date.249  The actual impacts of the McCutcheon decision already call the 
plurality’s skepticism of circumvention into question and the plurality’s re-
liance on the FEC regulations are misplaced. 
First, circumvention is already occurring.  Both parties have estab-
lished joint fundraising committees envisioned by the dissent’s example.250  
Joint fundraising committees have increased dramatically in number in re-
cent years.251  In 2012, 372 new joint fundraising committees were formed, 
compared to only 42 in 1994.252  In 2013, there were 415 “new or continu-
ing” joint fundraising committees and approximately 20 have been added 
since April 2014 when the Court decided McCutcheon.253  Though “[t]here 
has not been a flood of donations” to these new committees as of yet, “for 
individuals who can afford to give to dozens of campaigns, the new free-
dom offers yet another level of influence.”254  Furthermore, these commit-
tees in general have raised exponentially more funds for presidential cam-
paigns over time, “nearly doubling from $449 million in 2008 to $953 
million in 2012.”255 
By the summer of 2014, just a few months after the McCutcheon deci-
sion in April, over 300 contributors had given $11.6 million in excess of 
                                                          
 246.  Id. 
 247.  Id. at 1472–73; see McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 182 (2003) (“Large soft-money do-
nations at a candidate’s or officeholder’s behest give rise to all of the same corruption concerns 
posed by contributions made directly to the candidate or officeholder.”).  
 248.  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (plurality opinion).  
 249.  Id. at 1477 (citing 11 CFR § 110.1(h) (2014)). 
 250.  Matea Gold, Wealthy Political Donors Seize on New Latitude to Give to Unlimited Can-
didates, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/wealthy-political-
donors-seize-on-new-latitude-to-give-to-unlimited-candidates/2014/09/01/d94aeefa-2f8c-11e4-
bb9b-997ae96fad33_story.html.  
 251.  Kelner, supra note 233, at 382. 
 252.  Id. 
 253.  Id. at 382, 383.  
 254.  Gold, supra note 250. 
 255.  Kelner, supra note 233, at 382.  
  
50 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES [VOL. 74:23 
what they would have been allowed to donate before the decision.256  In to-
tal, contributions had reached $50.2 million as of July 2014, not including 
funds given to super PACs.257  Of this total amount, $16 million, or about 
32%, of the funds had “gone directly to candidates.”258 
Donors taking advantage of the eradication of aggregate limits have 
explicitly pointed to some of the types of corruption that the Court included 
in its definition prior to Citizens United.  As one donor told the Washington 
Post, “You have to realize, when you start contributing to all these guys, 
they give you access to meet them and talk about your issues . . . .  They 
know I’m a big supporter.”259  Another characterized the McCutcheon deci-
sion as allowing him to give the maximum amount of donations to a larger 
group of “good friends.”260  One donor had contributed to “25 Senate can-
didates and 16 House candidates.”261 
Second, the McCutcheon plurality’s reliance on other FEC regulations 
to prevent circumvention and corruption are misplaced.262  The plurality in 
particular highlighted the effectiveness of an FEC regulation that prevents 
donors from giving to both a candidate, and a political committee that the 
donor knows will support (or has supported) the same candidate.263  As the 
dissent noted, “nine FEC cases decided since the year 2000 . . . refer to this 
regulation.”264  In every single case except for one, “the FEC failed to find 
the requisite ‘knowledge’” on behalf of the donor who contributed to both a 
candidate and a political committee supporting that same candidate.265  In 
fact, the FEC has become somewhat notorious for lack of enforcement or 
investigation of potential base limit circumvention.266  The FEC is com-
posed of six members, four of which are needed to initiate an investiga-
tion.267  Ann Ravel, one of the commissioners, argues that the three Repub-
licans on the Commission have blocked all investigations recently and 
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warns that the “judiciary’s misguided deference [to the FEC]—in effect, a 
rubber-stamp approval of inaction—encourages the commissioners not to 
cooperate with one another.”268 
The Court’s own precedent warns against relying too heavily on anti-
circumvention measures already in place.  For example, in Colorado II, the 
Court found that an earmarking provision in the U.S. Code, similar to the 
FEC regulation discussed above, “would reach only the most clumsy at-
tempts to pass contributions through to candidates.”269  The Court conclud-
ed that considering the earmarking rule as the extent of the government’s 
ability to prevent circumvention would undermine its attempts to stop more 
subtle methods “through which parties could effectively pass excessive con-
tributions on to candidates.”270 
These real world examples coming just weeks and months in the wake 
of McCutcheon raise serious questions about the future of campaign finance 
regulations.  Without aggregate limits, base limits arguably are becoming 
meaningless.  Now the only true limit on how much an individual can spend 
comes down to the number of state and local party committees and PACs 
affiliated with each party.  As long as there are different committees for the 
individual to donate to, there is nothing to stop her from pouring in contri-
butions.  In the meantime, it will be critically important to protect the only 
true remaining limits on campaign spending—the base limits—by strength-
ening regulations of joint committee spending and reforming the FEC so 
that it can become a true campaign finance watchdog.271 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should have upheld FECA’s aggregate limits in 
McCutcheon.  First, the Court mischaracterized the government’s interest in 
preventing corruption, defining corruption too narrowly, breaking with 
precedent in this definition, and failing to defer to Congress’s understanding 
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of corruption when the Act was amended.272  Second, without aggregate 
limits, individuals can and have been able to work around FECA’s valid 
base limits.273  Donors have been able to engage in precisely the types of 
behavior that the Court was concerned with in its pre-Citizens United defi-
nition of corruption.274  Perhaps even more concerning is that fact that as 
long as the numbers of candidates, state and local party committees, and 
PACs continue to grow, the base limits will become an empty formality 
without an overall ceiling on individual contributions.275  This reality leaves 
open the question of whether McCutcheon has essentially eradicated mean-
ingful campaign finance regulation altogether. 
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